IICLE Flashpoint – August 2025
Martin v. Goodrich: The Illinois Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Sections 1(f) and 1.1 of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act
On January 24, 2025, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Martin v. Goodrich Corp., upholding the constitutionality of a 2019 amendment to the Illinois Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (the “Act”). This case required the Illinois Supreme Court to construe Sections 1(f) and 1.1 of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/1(f), 1.1) in the context of a wrongful death and survival action. The court was called upon to answer three key questions:
- Whether Section 1(f) imposes a statute of repose, thereby falling within the civil action exception created by Section 1.1;
- If so, whether Section 1.1 applies retroactively or prospectively;
- And whether applying Section 1.1 to pre-enactment exposures would violate the Illinois Constitution’s due process protections.
Factual and Procedural Background
The claimant, Rodney Martin, worked for BF Goodrich from 1966 to 2012. During his employment, he was exposed to vinyl chloride monomer and related chemical products—compounds known to cause sarcoma of the liver. His exposure to vinyl chloride ended in 1974. Decades later, in 2019, he was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver and died in July 2020. His widow, Candice Martin, filed a civil suit in November 2021 under the Wrongful Death Act and Survival Act, alleging that her husband’s occupational exposure caused his illness and death.
She named Goodrich and its successor, PolyOne, as defendants, seeking to proceed outside the workers’ compensation system by invoking Section 1.1 of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act. That provision, added in 2019, allows a plaintiff to pursue a civil action if compensation is barred under the Act by statute of repose.
The defendants moved to dismiss. PolyOne asserted a lack of personal jurisdiction. Goodrich argued that Section 1.1 was inapplicable because Section 1(f) constituted a statute of repose and that, in any event, the new provision could not retroactively revive a time-barred claim without violating constitutional due process rights.
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act and the Exclusivity Doctrine
The court reiterated that the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (WODA) was enacted to provide no-fault compensation for occupational diseases that are disabling as a result of workplace exposures (820 ILCS 310/1(d)). Like the Workers’ Compensation Act, WODA was intended to replace common law remedies with a more efficient, administrative process. The exclusivity provisions under Section 5(a) bar civil actions for work-related injuries in most circumstances.
However, this exclusivity is not absolute. The court noted that employees can pursue civil claims under four exceptions – when their condition is (1) not accidental, (2) did not arise from his employment (3) was not receive during the course of employment, or, (4) as in this case, is not compensable under the Act. This exception was squarely addressed in Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070, where the Supreme Court upheld the exclusivity bar despite the claim being time-barred under the Act, concluding that the absence of a remedy due to the statute of repose did not render the injury noncompensable.
The Folta decision led to widespread criticism due to its harsh result: the employee was left without any remedy. In response, the legislature enacted Section 1.1 in 2019, which explicitly allows civil actions where claims are barred under WODA by a statute of repose.
Section 1(f) Is a Statute of Repose
The first issue was whether Section 1(f), which bars compensation unless disablement occurs within a specified period after last exposure, constitutes a statute of repose. The court held that it does. Like Section 6(c)—previously identified in Folta as a statute of repose—Section 1(f) operates to extinguish claims after a defined period, regardless of when the injury manifests or whether it has yet accrued.
The court emphasized that both Section 1(f) and Section 6(c) are conditions precedent to recovery. Compliance with both is necessary for a valid claim under the WODA. Failure to meet these time limitations results not just in a procedural bar but a substantive extinguishment of the right to compensation. Thus, the protections of the Act, including the exclusivity bar, are no longer available to employers where Section 1.1 applies.
Section 1.1 Applies Prospectively
The court next turned to the temporal reach of Section 1.1. Because the statute does not expressly provide whether it is retroactive or prospective, the court applied Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4), which states that substantive amendments apply prospectively unless otherwise provided.
Section 1.1 was deemed substantive, as it created a new right of action outside the administrative system for certain claimants barred from relief under the WODA. As such, it may not be applied retroactively to revive previously extinguished claims. However, where an occupational disease was discovered after the statute’s enactment, the court concluded that civil remedy under Section 1.1 is available.
Section 1.1 Does Not Violate Due Process
The final issue was whether applying Section 1.1 to exposures that occurred decades earlier would violate employers’ due process rights under the Illinois Constitution. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that employers do not have a vested right in the exclusivity defense until the cause of action accrues, which occurs when all elements of the tort claim are present—namely, the diagnosis or discovery of injury.
In this case, the court noted that the injury (angiosarcoma) was discovered in 2019, and the civil complaint was filed in 2021—after the enactment of Section 1.1. Therefore, no vested right was disturbed. The exclusivity defense had not accrued before the legislative change, and the employer’s reliance on repose or exclusivity defenses did not carry constitutional weight under these facts.
This decision reverses the harsh outcomes resulting from Folta and signals the court’s continued deference to legislative corrections in the complex field of the occupational diseases law. Practitioners should carefully evaluate exposure timelines, diagnosis dates, and procedural posture when assessing case viability—particularly in toxic exposure claims arising outside the traditional temporal scope of the Workers’ Compensation or Occupational Diseases Acts.